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Abstract. Linux containers are gaining increasing traction in both in-
dividual and industrial use, and as these containers get integrated into
mission-critical systems, real-time detection of malicious cyber attacks
becomes a critical operational requirement. This paper introduces a real-
time host-based intrusion detection system that can be used to passively
detect malfeasance against applications within Linux containers running
in a standalone or in a cloud multi-tenancy environment. The demon-
strated intrusion detection system uses bags of system calls monitored
from the host kernel for learning the behavior of an application running
within a Linux container and determining anomalous container behavior.
Performance of the approach using a database application was measured
and results are discussed.
Keywords: Intrusion Detection, Anomaly Detection, System Call Mon-
itoring, Container Security, Security in Cloud Computing
1 Introduction
Linux containers, such as Docker [13] and LXC [9], rely on the kernel names-
paces and control groups (cgroups) for isolating the application running within
the container. They provide a significantly more efficient alternative to virtual
machines, since only the application and its dependencies need to be included
in the container, and not the kernel and its processes. With the use of control
groups and security profiles applied to containers, attack surface can be mini-
mized [17]. However, attacks on mission-critical applications running within the
container can still occur, and can represent an attack vector to the host kernel
itself [17]. As a result, understanding when the container has been compromised
is of key interest, yet little research has been conducted in this area.
Indeed, Linux containers are typically used to run applications in a multi-
tenancy cloud environments, where they share the same host kernel with other
containers. In a multi-tenancy environment, the service provider is entitled by
contractual means to monitor the behavior of containers running on the host
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kernel to provide safe environment for all hosted containers, and to protect the
host kernel itself from the attack of a malicious container. However, providing
information about the nature of the application running in the container, or
altering the container for monitoring purposes is usually undesirable, and more
often impermissible, especially when critical applications are running inside the
container. Such constraints mandate the use of a host-based intrusion detection
system (HIDS) that does not interfere with the container structure or applica-
tion.
One source of attack originates from outside the host attacking the host
kernel and/or the guest containers. Another source of attack comes from another
containers residing on the same host and attacking neighboring containers. A
third class of attack is when a container attacks the host kernel. To target these
attacks, we propose a HIDS that monitors system calls between the container
processes and the host kernel for malfeasance detection.
Utilizing system call traces for anomaly detection has been previously applied
at the process level [7][11][8][14], and has shown promising results when extended
to the granularity of virtual machines (VMs) [15][1][2]. It has also been used to
detect anomalies in Android applications by monitoring actions (aka system
calls) included in their Android intents [3].
There are two basic approaches to anomaly detection using system calls;
sequence-based approach and frequency-based approach. The former approach
keeps track of system call sequences in a database of normal behavior. The latter
drops the order of the system calls while keeping the frequency of occurrence
of each distinct system call. By not storing order information of the system
call sequence, frequency-based techniques requires much less storage space while
providing better performance and accuracy [8].
Bag of system calls (BoSC) [8] is a frequency-based approach that has been
used as VM-based anomaly detectors in the past, and has been found to be
a good performer [15][1][2]. Particular advantages associated with the use of
bags of systems calls, as opposed to sequences of system calls, are that it is
computationally manageable [1] and does not require limiting the application
programming interfaces [15].
This paper serves to propose a real-time HIDS that can be used to passively
detect anomalies of container behavior by using a technique similar to the one
described in [1]. We show that a frequency-based technique is sufficient for de-
tecting abnormality in container behavior. The proposed system does not require
any prior knowledge of the nature of the application inside the container, neither
does it require any alteration to the container nor the host kernel, which makes
it the first system to introduce opaque anomaly detection in containers, to the
best of our knowledge.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief summary
of related work. Section 3 provides an overview of the proposed system. Section 4
discusses the system evaluation. Section 5 concludes with summary and future
work.
2 Related Work
The Bag of System Calls (BoSC) technique is a frequency-based anomaly detec-
tion technique, that was first introduced by Kang et al. in 2005 [8]. In their paper,
Kang et al. define the bag of system call as an ordered list < c1, c2, . . . , cn >,
where n is the total number of distinct system calls, and ci is the number of
occurrences of the system call, si, in the given input sequence. By applying dif-
ferent machine learning techniques, such as 1-class Na¨ıve Bayes classification
and 2-means clustering, to the BoSC representation of two publicly-available
system-call datasets, namely the University of New Mexico (UNM) dataset and
the MIT Lincoln Lab dataset, they were able to show that the BoSC has better
performance and accuracy compared to STIDE [7], one of the most famous and
most popular sequence-based approaches.
The Sequence Time-Delay Embedding (STIDE) technique, introduced by For-
rest and Longstaff [7], defines normal behavior using a database of short se-
quences, each of size k. For building the database, they slide a window of size
k + 1 over the trace of system calls, and store the sequences of system calls.
Although STIDE is a simple and efficient technique, it can be seen that by keep-
ing the order information of the calls, the size of the database can grow linearly
with the number of system calls in the trace. Some improvements to the STIDE
technique were introduced in [11] and [19].
Another famous sequence-based intrusion detection technique is the one in-
troduced in [12]. The technique uses sliding windows (regions) of size 2l + 1,
with a sliding step of l, and relies on the RIPPER rule-induction application [5]
to classify sequences of system calls into normal and abnormal regions. If the
percentage of abnormal regions exceeds certain threshold, the trace is declared
intrusive.
A number of intrusion detection systems used sequences of system calls to
train a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) classifier [19][18][20][4][10]. However, each
system differs in the technique used for raising anomaly signal. Wang et al. [18],
for example, raise anomaly signal when the probability of the whole sequence
is below certain threshold. Warrender et al. [19], on the other hand, declares
a sequence as anomalous when the probability of one system call within a se-
quence is below the threshold. Cho and Park [4] used HMM for modeling normal
root privilege operations only. Hoang et al. [10] introduced a multi-layer detec-
tion technique that combines both outcomes from applying the Sliding Window
approach and the HMM approach.
Warrender et. al compared STIDE, RIPPER, and HMM-based methods
in [19]. They concluded that all methods performed adequately, while HMM
gave the best accuracy on average. However, it required higher computational
resources and storage space, since it makes multiple passes through the training
data, and stores significant amount of intermediate data, which is computation-
ally expensive, especially for large traces.
The Kernel State Modeling (KSM) technique represents traces of system calls
as states of Kernel modules [14]. The technique observes three critical states,
namely Kernel (KL), Memory Management (MM), and File System (FS) states.
The technique then detects anomaly by calculating the probability of occurrences
of the three observed states in each trace of system calls, and comparing the
calculated probabilities against the probabilities of normal traces. Applied to
Linux-based programs of the UNM dataset, the KSM technique shows higher
detection rates and lower false positive rates, compared to STIDE and HMM-
based techniques.
Alarifi and Wolthusen used system calls for implementing a HIDS for virtual
machines residing in a multi-tenancy Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environ-
ment. They dealt with the VM as a single process, despite the numerous pro-
cesses running inside it, and monitored system calls between the VM and the
host operating system [1] [2].
In [1], they used the BoSC technique in combination with the sliding window
technique for anomaly detection. In their technique, they read the input trace
epoch by epoch. For each epoch, a sliding window of size k moves over the
system calls of each epoch, adding bags of system calls to the normal behavior
database. The normal behavior database holds frequencies of bags of system
calls. After building the normal-behavior database, i.e. training their classifier,
an epoch is declared anomalous if the change in BoSC frequencies during that
epoch exceeds certain threshold. For a sliding window of size 10, their technique
gave 100% accuracy, with 100% detection rate, and 0% false positive rate.
In [2], Alarifi and Wolthusen applied HMM for learning sequences of system
calls for short-lived virtual machines. They based their decision on the conclusion
from [19] that “HMM almost always provides a high detection rate and a low
minimum false positives but with high computational demand”. Their HMM-
based technique gave lower detection rates, yet required lower number of training
samples. By using 780, 000 system calls for training, the resulting detection rate
was 97%.
In their work, Chen et al. [3] applied HMM for recognizing malicious Android
applications by monitoring actions (system calls) in Android intents issued by
the application. They concluded that their technique, while capable of detecting
malicious Android applications at runtime, did not have high performance, which
they ascribed to not having enough Intent messages to further train the classifier.
3 Real-time Intrusion Detection
In this paper, we propose a HIDS that uses a technique similar to the one de-
scribed in [1] to be applied to Linux containers. The technique combines the
sliding window technique [7] with the bag of system calls technique [8]. The
technique ignores the order of system calls, and only keeps track of the frequen-
cies of the system calls in the current window. As described in section 1, the
system works in real time, i.e. it learns behavior of the container and detects
anomaly at runtime. It also works in opaque mode, i.e. it does not require any
prior knowledge about the nature of the container nor the enclosed application.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the system architecture and data flow as described
below.
Fig. 1. Real-time Intrusion Detection System
Our system employs a background service running on the host kernel to mon-
itor system calls between any Docker containers and the host Kernel. Starting
a new container on the host kernel triggers the service, which uses the Linux
strace tool to trace all system calls issued by the container to the host kernel.
The strace tool reports system calls with their originating process ID, argu-
ments, and return values.
In addition, strace is also used to generate a syscall-list file that holds a
preassembled list of distinct system calls sorted by the number of occurrences.
The list is collected from a container running the same application under no
attack. The syscall-list file is used to create a syscall-index lookup table. Table 1
shows sample entries of a typical syscall-index lookup table.
The behavior file generated by strace is then parsed in either online or
offline mode. In online mode, the system-call parser reads system calls from the
same file as it is being written by the strace tool for real-time classification.
Offline mode, on the other hand, is only used for system evaluation as described
in section 4. In offline mode, a copy of the original behavior file is used as input
to the system to guarantee the coherence between the collected statistics. The
system call parser reads one system call at a time by trimming off arguments,
return values, and process IDs.
Table 1. Syscall-Index Lookup Table
Syscall Index
select 4
access 12
lseek 22
other 40
Table 2. Example of system call parsing
Syscall Index Sliding window BoSC
pwrite 6 [futex, futex, sendto, futex, sendto, pwrite] [2,0,3,0,0,0,1,0,...,0]
sendto 0 [futex, sendto, futex, sendto, pwrite, sendto] [3,0,2,0,0,0,1,0,...,0]
futex 2 [sendto, futex, sendto, pwrite, sendto, futex] [3,0,2,0,0,0,1,0,...,0]
sendto 0 [futex, sendto, pwrite, sendto, futex, sendto] [3,0,2,0,0,0,1,0,...,0]
The parsed system call is then used for updating a sliding window of size
10, and counting the number of occurrences of each distinct system call in the
current window, to create a new bag of system calls. As mentioned earlier, a
bag of system calls is an array < c1, c2, . . . , cns > where ci is the number of
occurrences of system call, si, in the current window, and ns is the total number
of distinct system calls. When a new occurrence of a system call is encountered,
the application retrieves the index of the system call from the syscall-index
lookup table, and updates the corresponding index of the BoSC. For a window
size of 10, the sum of all entries of the array equals 10, i.e.
∑ns
i=1 ci = 10. A
sequence size of 6 or 10 is usually recommended when using sliding-window
techniques for better performance [7][19][11]. Here, we are using 10 since it was
already shown for a similar work that size 10 gives better performance than size
6 without dramatically affecting the efficiency of the algorithm [1]. Table 2 shows
an example of this process for sequence size of 6.
The created BoSC is then passed to classifier, which works in one of two
modes; training mode and detection mode. For training mode, the classifier
simply adds the new BoSC to the normal-behavior database. If the current BoSC
already exists in the normal-behavior database, its frequency is incremented by
1. Otherwise, the new BoSC is added to the database with initial frequency of
1. The normal-behavior database is considered stable once all expected normal-
behavior patterns are applied to the container. Table 3 shows sample entries of
a normal-behavior database.
For detection mode, the system reads the behavior file epoch by epoch. For
each epoch, a sliding window is similarly used to check if the current BoSC is
present in the database of normal behavior database. If a BoSC is not present
in the database, a mismatch is declared. The trace is declared anomalous if the
number of mismatches within one epoch exceeds a certain threshold.
Furthermore, a continuous training is applied during detection mode to fur-
ther improve the false positive rate of the system. The bags of system calls
Table 3. Normal Behavior Database
BoSC Frequency
0,1,0,2,0,0,0,0,1,0,3,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1 15
0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,3,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1 8
0,1,0,2,0,0,5,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1 2
0,1,0,2,0,2,0,0,1,0,2,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1 1
seen during the current epoch are stored in a temporary current-epoch-change
database rather than being added directly to the normal-behavior database. At
the end of each epoch, if no anomaly signal was raised during the current epoch,
the entries of the current-epoch-change database are committed to the normal-
behavior database, to be included in classification for future epochs.
4 System Evaluation
4.1 Environment setup
For our experiments, we are using a Docker container running on a Ubuntu
Server 14.04 host operating system. The docker image we used for creating the
container is the official mysql Docker image, which is basically a Docker image
with MySQL 5.6 installed on a Debian operating system.
On container start, the container automatically creates a default database,
adds users defined by the environment variables passed to the container, and
then starts listening for connections. Docker maps the MySQL port from the
container to some custom port on the host.
Since there is no dataset available that contains system calls collected from
containers, we needed to create our own datasets for both normal and anoma-
lous behavior. For that, we created a container from the mysql Docker image.
A normal-behavior work load was initially applied to the container, before it
got “attacked” using a penetration testing tool. More details about generating
datasets are given in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.2 Generating normal workload
For generating normal-behavior dataset, we used mysqlslap [16]; a program that
emulates client load for a MySQL server. The tool has command-line options that
allow the user to select the level of concurrency, and the number of iterations
to run the load test. In addition, it gives the user the option to customize the
created database, e.g. by specifying the number of varcher and/or int columns
to use when creating the database. Moreover, the user can select the number of
insertions and queries to perform on the database.
The tool runs on the host kernel, and communicates with the MySQL server
running on the container. The values we used for generating the normal-behavior
workload are shown in table 4.
Table 4. Parameters used for automatic Load generation
Parameter Value
Number of generated varchar columns 4
Number of generated int columns 3
Number of simulated clients 50
Number of load-test iterations 5
Number of unique insertion statements 100
Total number of insertions per thread 1000
Number of unique query statements 100
Total number of queries per thread 1000
Additionally, we used the SQL dump file of a real-life database to create
schemas, tables, views, and to add entries to the tables, on the MySQL server
of the container.
4.3 Simulating malicious behavior
To simulate an attack on the container, we used sqlmap [6]; an automatic SQL
injection tool normally used for penetration testing purposes. In our experiment,
we are using it to generate malicious-behavior dataset by attacking the MySQL
database created on the container. Similarly, the sqlmap tool runs on the host
kernel, and communicates with the attacked database through the Docker proxy.
We applied the following attacks on the container:
– Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack: Using wild cards to slow down database.
The attack generated an average of 37 mismatches
– Operating system takeover attempt: Attempt to run cat /etc/passwd shell
command (failed). Generated 279 mismatches
– File-system access: Copy /etc/passwd to local machine. Generated 182 mis-
matches
– Brute-force attack: We used the --all option of sqlmap to retrieve all info
about the database management system (DBMS), including users, roles,
schemas, passwords, tables, columns, and number of entries. The attack was
strong enough to generate around 42,000 mismatches.
4.4 Collecting container-behavior data
A background service, running on the host kernel, automatically detects any
newly started Docker container, and traces system calls of the new container
using the Linux strace tool.
The service relies on the Docker command events to signal the service when-
ever a new container is started on the host kernel. Upon detection of the new con-
tainer, the service starts to trace all processes running, on container start, within
the control group (cgroup) of the container. The list of processes is retrieved from
the tasks file located at /sys/fs/cgroup/devices/docker/$CID/tasks, where
$CID is the long ID of the new container. The service also traces any forked child
processes by using the -F option of the strace tool.
To separate the normal behavior from the malicious behavior of the container
for testing purposes, an indicator signal is injected into the behavior file before
and after each attack, to be recognized by the classifier.
4.5 Training classifier
We have implemented the classification system described in figure 1 in a Java
application that uses the technique described in section 3.
The application starts by building a syscall-index hash map from the syscall-
list file. The hash map stores distinct system calls as the key, and a corresponding
index as the value. A system call that appears in the whole trace less than the
total number of distinct system calls is stored in the map as “other”. Using
“other” for relatively rarely-used system calls saves space, memory, and compu-
tation time, as described in [1]. By using a hash map, looking up the index of a
system call is an O(1) operation.
The system call parser then reads one system call at a time from the be-
havior log file, and updates the normal-behavior database. The normal-behavior
database is another hash map with the BoSC as the key and the frequency of the
bag as the value. If the current bag already exists in the database, the frequency
value is incremented. Otherwise, a new entry is added to the database. Again,
by using a hash map for implementing the database, the time complexity for
updating the database is O(1).
As described in section 3, the application uses the sliding window technique
to read sequences of system calls from the trace file, with each sequence is of
size 10. A bag of system calls is then created by counting the frequency of
each distinct system call within the current window. The created bag of system
calls is a frequency array of size ns, where ns is the number of distinct system
calls. When a new occurrence of a system call is encountered, the application
retrieves the index of the system call from the syscall-index hash map, and the
corresponding index of the frequency array is updated. The new BoSC is then
added to the normal-behavior database.
4.6 Classifier evaluation
The generated normal-behavior database is then applied to the rest of the behav-
ior file epoch by epoch for anomaly detection. For each epoch, the sliding window
technique is similarly used to create BoSCs. The BoSCs noticed during the cur-
rent epoch are added to temporary database. A mismatch is declared whenever
a BoSC is not present in the database. If the number of mismatches exceeds a
certain threshold, Td, within one epoch, an anomaly signal is raised. Otherwise,
the entries of the temporary database are committed to the normal-behavior
database for future epochs.
For evaluation purposes, the system-call parser recognizes the start-of-attack
and end-of-attack signals injected during the data collection phase to mark the
epochs involved in the attack as malicious. This information is used to accurately
and automatically calculate the true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate
(FPR) metrics, defined as follows:
TPR = Ntp/Nmalicious (1)
FPR = Nfp/Nnormal (2)
where Nnormal and Nmalicious are the total number of normal and malicious
sequences, respectively, and Ntp and Nfp are the number of true positives and
false positives, respectively.
To evaluate the system accuracy with respect to different system parame-
ters, we applied the classifier to the same input behavior file while varying the
following test parameters:
– Epoch Size (S): The total number of system calls in one epoch. For our
experiment, we used epoch size between 1000 and 10,000 with step of 500.
– Detection Threshold (Td): The number of detected mismatches per epoch
before raising an anomaly signal. We used values between 10 to 100 with a
step of 10 for each epoch size listed above.
4.7 Evaluation Results
We applied the proposed system to a trace of 3, 804, 000 system calls, of which the
classifier used 875, 000 system calls for training. The number of distinct system
calls (ns) was 40, and the size of the normal behavior database was around 17k
BoSCs.
The malicious data created a strong anomaly signal with an average of 695
mismatches per epoch, as compared to an average of 33 mismatches per epoch
for normal data. For S = 1000 and Td = 10S, the TPR is 100% and the FPR is
2%. Figure 2 shows the TPR and FPR of the system for different epoch sizes at
the same detection threshold of 10. It can be seen that the lower the epoch size,
the lower the FPR.
As shown in figure 3, the detection threshold highly affects the detection rate
of the system especially when short-lived attacks are introduced to the container.
4.8 Complexity analysis
By using hash map for the index map and the database, the time complexity
for looking up an index for a given system call, and for updating the database
with a new BoSC, are both O(1) operations. The time complexity for comparing
the database before and after an epoch k, and computing the similarity metric,
is O(nk), where nk is the size of the database after epoch k. Hence, it can be
Fig. 2. Effect of changing epoch size on system accuracy
Fig. 3. Effect of changing detection threshold on system accuracy
seen that the algorithm used is linear in the size of the input trace. The time
complexity of running an epoch of size S is O(S + nk).
The algorithm only uses storage for the index map and the database. The
index map holds <String, Integer> pairs. Assuming the average size of the
system-call hash to be 8 characters, the total size of an index map of size ns is
16ns bytes (Typically ns < 50). The database stores array of bytes (a string) of
size ns as the key, and an integer as the value. For a normal-behavior database
of size nk, the total size of the database is (ns + 8)nk bytes.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have introduced an opaque real-time host-based intrusion de-
tection system for detecting anomaly in the behavior of Linux containers. The
proposed HIDS used a frequency-based anomaly detection technique previously
applied to VMs. We were able to show that a high detection rate of 100% is
easily achievable using a low detection threshold of 10 mismatches per epoch.
While the noticed FPR was relatively low (around 2%), we were not able to
achieve a zero FPR for the used application and the applied learning technique.
We attribute that to the non-repetitive behavior of the application, and the
memory-based nature of the learning algorithm. It was noticed that applying
the same workload to the MySQL database may not generate the exact same
BoSCs, which is normally expected by an instance-based technique. Future work
is to be directed to testing the system to applications of repetitive nature, such
as a map-reduce application, and to modify the learning technique used to be
more adaptive to slight changes of the BoSCs generated.
Considering their popularity and simplicity of deployment, we are focusing on
securing Docker containers for this research. However, the same methods can be
extended to any other Linux containers, since they all share the same underlying
architecture.
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